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INTRODUCTION1 
In 2014, price shocks sent waves of financial distress throughout the 
oil and gas industry, as the price of crude oil plummeted from a high of 
$100.36/bbl in June to a low of $31.62/bbl by the beginning of February.2 
This drop in prices hit many American producers especially hard because 
a growing share of production in the United States has been sourced from 
“unconventional” deposits with limited permeability, which involve 
higher production costs relative to traditional sources of petroleum.3 
Consequently, there is growing concern over bankruptcy in the industry, 
with prices continuing to be suppressed over a year after their initial fall.4  
                                                                                                             
 1. This Article is based on a presentation by our firm at the 2014 Texas 
Bench Bar Conference titled “Today’s Oil and Gas Market: Managing and 
Mitigating Bankruptcy Risk.” David M. Bennett, Today’s Oil and Gas Market: 
Managing and Mitigating Bankruptcy Risks (2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.tklaw.com/files/Publication/6bd977c5-ad04-4a0a-a4a3-
575e4dd4b242/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ab5898d2-0fca-455f-a285-5a 
b58228cd3e/Today's%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Market%3B%20Managing%20a
nd%20Mitigating%20Bankruptcy%20Risks.pdf. 
 2. Crude Oil, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/crude-oil.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2016).  
 3. Ed Crooks, US Shale Industry Braced for Bankruptcy, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 
6, 2015, 1:37 PM), www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5974a3ce-52e0-11e5-b029-
b9d50a74fd14.html#axzz3wSuE689J; see also Jennifer Cruz, Peter W. Smith & 
Sara Stanely, The Marcellus Shale Gas Boom in Pennsylvania: Employment and 
Wage Trends (U.S. Bureau of Statistics Monthly Labor Report, Feb. 2014); U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-12-732, OIL AND GAS: 
INFORMATION ON SHALE RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS (2012). 
 4. Crooks, supra note 3. 
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The recent price shock illustrates just one of the many threats to parties 
in an industry characterized by pervasive risk.5 From natural disasters to 
human error, risk events may cause firms in the oil and gas industry to 
incur debilitating costs that render them insolvent. As a result, the threat 
of counterparty insolvency is always looming for parties to oil and gas 
contracts. 
Due to the omnipresent threat of counterparty insolvency, parties should 
actively manage counterparty credit risk. Long-term credit risk management 
in oil and gas contracts is challenging because production in some fields 
lasts many decades and a contract counterparty may change completely or 
suffer financial reverses. Accordingly, such long-term contracts should be 
written with the view that one’s counterparty will evade its debts and will 
be the subject of bankruptcy proceedings. 
Although the institution of bankruptcy proceedings normally suggests 
that many creditors will not be satisfied in full, there are a number of 
strategies that a party to an oil and gas contract can employ to increase its 
chances of satisfaction. These strategies should be considered before a 
potential party enters into an agreement. That party may consider a range of 
factors before determining whether to employ a particular strategy, 
especially the type of contractual relationship under consideration. 
This Article addresses five major contract relationships and furnishes 
advice to protect clients or companies in the event of bankruptcy. These 
relatively simple and inexpensive steps can save millions of dollars and 
protect clients and companies from the draconian “strong arm” powers 
given to a trustee or debtor-in-possession in bankruptcy.6  
Part I of this Article discusses the treatment of claims in bankruptcy 
proceedings generally as well as the significance of a creditor’s unsecured 
claims in particular, providing background information for discussions of 
the consequences of bankruptcy for specific contractual relationships. 
Parts II through VI discuss the consequences of bankruptcy for parties to 
sales contracts for oil and gas production, joint operating agreements, oil 
and gas leases, purchase and sale agreements, and farmout agreements, 
respectively, as well as furnish relevant, practical strategies. Part VII 
discusses a final strategy that can be applied to various types of 
relationships—“Bad Boy” guaranties. This Article concludes with a 
summary of advice for protecting a party to oil and gas contracts from the 
consequences of counterparty credit risk. 
                                                                                                             
 5. See generally ROBERTA BIGLIANI, REDUCING RISKS IN OIL AND GAS 
OPERATIONS (2013), available at http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports 
/minimizing-operational-risk-in-oil-gas-industry.pdf. 
 6. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2014). 
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I. PRIORITY OF “CLAIMS” IN BANKRUPTCY 
The practical advice presented in this Article are responses to the 
treatment of “claims” in bankruptcy proceedings. Under the Bankruptcy 
Code, a “claim” is essentially defined as a “right to payment” or a “right 
to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise 
to a right to payment.”7 A claim is treated differently depending on its 
classification under the Bankruptcy Code, including whether it is, among 
other things, secured or unsecured.8 
The treatment of an unsecured claim in bankruptcy proceedings shows 
the importance of obtaining adequate security from a potential bankruptcy 
debtor. A claim is unsecured to the extent that the creditor has failed to 
obtain a valid lien or security interest to secure the value of the debtor’s 
obligation to the creditor.9 In most cases, such claims will be practically 
worthless because there will be few assets of the debtor remaining after all 
higher priority claims are satisfied.10 
Claims are satisfied in accordance with a priority scheme provided by 
the Bankruptcy Code as supplemented by relevant state law.11 The goal is 
to be at the top of the food chain, which is basically delineated as follows:  
 
1. Owners are at the top because an ownership interest passes 
through bankruptcy.12 It is best to own mineral interests or real 
property interests such as production payment, relinquished 
interest, working interest, or farmout interest. 
2. Covenants running with the land are next. If the obligations can 
be characterized as covenant running with the land, the majority 
view is the counterparty cannot the reject contract in bankruptcy.  
3. Generally, secured creditors (lien creditors) are entitled to the 
value of their collateral. 
4. Administrative Claims (super-priority or general administrative) 
(20 day claims) are fourth. 
5. Unsecured Claims (priority or general unsecured) fall into the 
fifth position. 
6. Equity Interests (preferred or common) come last. 
                                                                                                             
 7. Id. § 101(5). 
 8. Id. § 507. 
 9. See id. § 506(a)(1). 
 10. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL 186 
(8th ed. 2013). 
 11. 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
 12.  See id. § 507. 
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As this list makes clear, a secured creditor is in a more advantageous 
position than an unsecured creditor and, thus, is more likely to have its 
claims satisfied. Consequently, one way to manage counterparty credit 
risk is by securing the obligations of potential debtors on the front end. 
However, the mechanics of and issues surrounding securing a claim varies 
depending on the type of contractual relationship under consideration. 
II. SALES CONTRACTS FOR OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION  
One type of contractual relationship that may be threatened by 
bankruptcy proceedings is a sales contract for oil and gas production. 
When oil and gas production is sold on credit without a security agreement 
to secure the purchase price, the seller will bear significant risk of 
nonpayment if the purchaser declares bankruptcy, as the seller will have a 
mere unsecured claim.13 As a result, it is important for the seller to obtain 
an attached and perfected security interest—or some other right—in 
collateral to guarantee payment by purchasers. This observation is 
important for both producers selling to first purchasers and first purchasers 
selling to downstream purchasers. 
In practice, oil and gas production is frequently bought and sold by 
various parties before it reaches the end consumer. After producers extract 
the oil or gas, first purchasers typically buy the oil or gas at the wellhead 
from local tanks located on the leased premises, or at nearby market 
centers. First purchasers often—particularly in the case of oil—transport 
the products for temporary storage before reselling to downstream 
purchasers, such as refiners or commodities traders. Consequently, each 
party involved in the various transactions is paid on a different timeline, 
resulting in open balances between parties at different points of the 
process.  
The timeline for payment under oil and gas sales contracts depends on 
the nature of the interests involved. Producers are customarily paid by first 
purchasers on either the 20th day or 25th day of each month for oil or gas 
produced in the previous calendar month. Thus, producers have essentially 
extended credit for 50 to 56 days of production.14 First purchasers are then 
paid by downstream purchasers pursuant to the terms of their respective 
agreements. The multiple parties involved with the production and 
shipment of oil or gas results in competing interests.  
Due to competing interests, sellers and lenders should timely perfect 
security interests or liens in the oil and gas sold to outrank other creditors 
                                                                                                             
 13. See id. § 506(a)(1). 
 14. For example, SemCrude filed bankruptcy on the 20th day of the month to 
maximize its cash, which resulted in maximum losses to its sellers.  
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who may have interests in the same collateral. Although some of these 
interests are brought about by specific clauses in the contract, others may 
arise by operation of law.  
Following bankruptcies of Basin, Inc., Brio Petroleum, Inc., Compton 
Petroleum Corp., and Gratex Corp. in 1982, several states enacted 
statutory producers’ liens.15 Texas,16 Oklahoma,17 New Mexico,18 
Kansas,19 and North Dakota20 have enacted statutes that grant royalty 
owners, producers, and other oil and gas interest owners a statutory 
security lien to secure payment of the purchase price for that production.21 
Importantly, certain states allow these security interests to be treated as 
purchase money security interests (“PMSI”).22 A PMSI is a security 
interest or claim on property that enables a lender or provider of goods on 
credit who provides financing for the acquisition of goods or equipment to 
obtain priority ranking ahead of other secured creditors.23 Because the 
producer is the one actually furnishing the goods—in this case the oil or 
gas—it is logical that a producer have a PMSI-like lien in such goods and 
the proceeds of their sale. Before a party may take advantage of the super 
priority of such producers’ liens, however, those liens must be made 
effective against third parties.  
Some states provide for producers’ liens that are not automatically 
perfected and involve certain temporal limitations. For example, to perfect 
and maintain the New Mexico producers’ lien, the interest owners must 
file a Notice of Lien (similar to notices that are needed to perfect statutory 
                                                                                                             
 15. See generally Terry I. Cross, Oil and Gas Product Liens—Statutory 
Security Interests for Producers and Royalty Owners Under the Statutes of 
Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. 
REP. 418 (1996). 
 16. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.343 (West 2011).  
 17. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 549.1, 549.3 (West 2011).  
 18. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-9-1, 48-9-3 (West 2003). 
 19. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-339a (West 2008). Interest owners in Kansas 
are required to file an “affidavit of production” in the register of deeds of the 
county where the oil and gas is produced to perfect the security interest. Id. § 84-
9-339a(b). Like Texas, the security interest in and lien on produced oil and gas is 
treated as a PMSI for purposes of determining priority relative to other Article 9 
security interests. Id. § 84-9-339a(h). 
 20. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 35-37-02 (West 2008). 
 21. Mississippi grants a lien to royalty owners to secure the payment of the 
royalty proceeds. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 53-3-41 (West 2014). Unlike the other 
liens, however, a producer who is not also a royalty owner would not be protected. 
Id.  
 22. See supra notes 16, 19. 
 23. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103 (West 2011). 
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mechanics liens) “after fifteen days and within forty-five days after 
payment is due by terms of agreement.”24 The lien terminates if the notice 
is not timely filed, and if timely filed, the lien expires one year after the 
date of the filing of the notice unless an action to enforce the lien is 
begun.25 North Dakota’s Oil and Gas Owner’s Lien Act26 is similar to New 
Mexico’s. North Dakota’s Oil and Gas Owner’s Lien Act grants interest 
owners a continuing security interest in and lien on unpaid oil or gas until 
the purchase price has been paid to the interest owner.27 To perfect the 
security interest on oil and gas, producers are required to file a UCC-1A 
in North Dakota’s central indexing system, record the lien in the real estate 
records in the county in which the well is located, and provide other 
interest owners with a copy of the notice of the lien by registered mail.28 
The security interest must be perfected within 90 days from the date of 
production; otherwise the security interest will not have priority over other 
security interests in the same oil or gas.29  
Other states provide for producers’ liens that are “automatically” 
perfected.30 For example, under the Texas producers’ lien statute, a 
security interest “is perfected automatically without the filing of a 
financing statement.”31 Specifically, the statute provides that “[i]f the 
interest of the secured party is evidenced by a deed, mineral deed, 
reservation in either, oil or gas lease, assignment, or any other such record 
recorded in the real property records of a county clerk, that record is 
effective as a filed financing statement.”32 
Even in states that allow automatic perfection, producers may receive 
better treatment if they also file a UCC-1. For example, while the Texas 
producers’ lien is automatically perfected under the Texas statute,33 the 
bankruptcy court for the District of Delaware held that a producers’ lien 
was subordinate to a contractual secured lender’s lien because the Texas 
producer had not filed a UCC-1 in the state of incorporation of the 
purchaser of the production before the contractual secured lender’s lien.34 
                                                                                                             
 24. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-9-5 (West 2003). 
 25. Id. 
 26. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-37-01 to 06 (West 2008 & Supp. 2015). 
 27. Id. § 35-37-02. 
 28. Id. § 35-37-04. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.343 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 52, § 549.1 (West 2011). 
 31. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.343(b). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Samson Res. Co. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.), 407 B.R. 
140, 158 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). 
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The lower priority resulted in the loss of approximately $57 million to the 
Texas owner’s interest in the oil and gas proceeds.35 Thus, to ensure the 
best priority for the Texas producers’ lien, producers who are selling on 
credit should file a UCC-1 in the state of incorporation of the first 
purchaser of the production rather than rely solely on automatic 
perfection.36 A recent check of UCC records shows this advice is not being 
followed. But the lessons learned from bankruptcies of large purchasers 
such as Enron and Semcrude show that it needs to be done regardless of 
the size or reputation of the purchaser of production. A protective UCC 
preserving possibly millions of dollars in liens can be filed at a relatively 
nominal cost.37  
Assuming that the security interest is timely perfected, then the security 
interest and lien takes priority over the rights of persons whose rights or 
claims arise afterwards, but may not take priority over the security interest 
and liens previously created and perfected.38  
The Oklahoma legislature amended the producers’ lien statute in an 
attempt to ensure both automatic perfection and first priority to producer 
lienholders following the Semcrude decision.39 The Oklahoma statute 
purports to grant producers an automatically perfected lien that has first 
priority over other competing Article 9 security interests even if the 
competing interests are first-in-time.40 The sole exception to this grant of 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id.; Victor Chiu & Penelope Christophorou, Presentation, Joint Meeting of 
the UCC Committee and the Commercial Finance Committee (Aug. 1, 2009), 
available at https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL710000pub/materi 
als/2009/annual/semgroup-bankruptcy.pdf. 
 36. Note that filing a protective UCC might not guarantee the producer is 
senior to a lender. Because the producers’ lien was a non-standard UCC provision 
and no UCC-1 was filed, the court did not need to address the issue of priority 
based on date of filing, which might give the bank another argument if it filed 
first. If a producer does not file a UCC, however, the secured lender will win. As 
of January 2016, the producers are still appealing their treatment to the Second 
Circuit. As long as there is any question, the better practice is to file a protective 
UCC. 
 37. For example, in Delaware, Capitol Services charges $125 to file a UCC-
1, plus cost of any paralegal time, and a state charge of $2 per page in excess of 
four pages. If the same purchaser is in multiple states with statutory liens, it can 
file one UCC for multiple states.  
 38. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 35-37-01 (West 2008). 
 39. See Sahar Jooshani, There’s a New Act in Town: How the Oklahoma Oil 
and Gas Owners’ Lien Act of 2010 Strengthens the Position of Oklahoma Interest 
Owners, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 133, 142 (2012). The Texas legislature did not address 
the Sumcrude problem. 
 40. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 549.7 (West 2011). 
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priority is a permitted lien.41 A “permitted lien” under the Oklahoma 
statute is a “validly perfected and enforceable lien created by statute or by 
rule or regulation of a governmental agency for storage or transportation 
charges . . . owed by a first purchaser in relation to oil or gas originally 
purchased under an agreement to sell.”42 Thus, a permitted lien is a narrow 
exception to the otherwise broad superior priority granted in favor of first 
sellers of production by the Oklahoma producers’ lien statute. Although 
the Oklahoma legislature purportedly addressed the Semcrude problem, 
until courts decide the legislative fix worked, the better practice is to file 
a protective UCC-1. 
In summary, perfecting producers’ liens should be on a marketing 
checklist because when in bankruptcy, the failure to properly perfect 
producers’ liens in accordance with the specific jurisdiction’s statute poses 
a risk of significant loss to producers as a result of lower priority.43 A 
producer’s inability to recover amounts owed because of lower priority 
and the ensuring lower recovery as an unsecured creditor is a real threat to 
an otherwise sound contractual relationship is one of many risks that 
unprepared parties face as a result of a bankruptcy proceeding. 
III. JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS 
A second type of contractual relationship that may be threatened by 
bankruptcy proceedings is a joint operating agreement (“JOA”). A JOA is 
an “agreement between or among interested parties for the operation of a 
tract or leasehold for oil, gas and other minerals,” by which “[t]he parties to 
the agreement share in the expenses of the operations and in the proceeds of 
development.”44 It is important to note that “the agreement normally is not 
intended to affect the ownership of the minerals or the rights to produce,” 
and, thus, the JOA does not create a separate entity distinct from the working 
interest owners who are parties to the agreement.45 Consequently, working 
interest owners must include provisions in the JOA that allocate drilling and 
production risks among themselves. This allocation of risks may be 
disturbed if one of the working interest owners is the subject of bankruptcy 
proceedings. Accordingly, as this Part will show, a party to a JOA should 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. § 549.2(11)(b). 
 43. For the importance of checklists in every business endeavor, this Author 
recommends the very interesting, best-selling book, ATUL GAWANDE, THE 
CHECKLIST MANIFESTO (2011). 
 44. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL 
AND GAS LAW, § 8-J (LexisNexis 2014). 
 45. Id. 
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protect against working interest owner credit risk by obtaining and 
perfecting a security interest or a party to the JOA may also have protection 
through setoff and recoupment. 
A. Mitigating Credit Risk by Obtaining and Perfecting a Security Interest 
or Lien 
One way to mitigate working interest owner credit risk under a JOA 
is by obtaining and perfecting a lien or security interest in oil and gas 
leases, personal property, or fixtures, as are specifically set forth in the 
Model Form Operating Agreement. Without a perfected lien or security 
interest, a party to the JOA will have a mere unsecured claim for another 
working interest owner’s share of production and drilling costs under the 
agreement.46 Thus, to protect itself to the greatest extent possible, a party 
to the JOA should make sure its interest is both adequately perfected and 
of maximum value. 
1. Avoiding Common Pitfalls When Perfecting a Security Interest or 
Lien 
The importance of an adequately perfected security interest or lien for 
securing a counterparty’s obligations under a JOA should not be 
underestimated. Remember that no matter how stellar the counterparty is 
today, documents should be drafted and security interests perfected under 
the assumption that the interest will either be assigned to a persistent debt 
evader or the counterparty’s new management will worsen. Bankruptcy 
most often is a response to severe financial distress and usually is a last 
resort because of the high cost and risk to the enterprise.47 Due to the 
limited resources available to repay creditors, pre-bankruptcy general 
unsecured claims and open-account debts often are paid either pennies on 
the dollar or not at all. Given this present-tense risk of non-payment or 
non-performance by the counterparty, the risk that the counterparty will 
become bankrupt should be considered from the beginning of the 
contractual relationship. Obtaining a lien or security interest to secure a 
claim under a contract is a first line of defense. The steps required to 
                                                                                                             
 46. 11 U.S.C. §507(3) (2014). 
 47. In fact, bankruptcy comes with high costs of administration and the need 
for transparency in business practices and structure. And there is no guarantee that 
a company that goes into bankruptcy will come out on the other side. See 
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A 
Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 636 (2008) (approximately 30% 
to 50% of Chapter 11 cases filed confirm plans). 
2016] MINIMIZING COUNTERPARTY BANKRUPTCY RISK 873 
 
 
 
perfect the liens and security interests available to secure different oil and 
gas contracts, however, will vary with the nature of the contract, and a 
party must seek to avoid common pitfalls to ensure its security interest or 
lien is effective against third persons and trustees in bankruptcy. 
a. Failure to Perfect a Security Interest or Lien  
A common pitfall associated with obtaining a security interest or lien is 
failing to perfect that interest before the institution of bankruptcy proceedings. 
A lien or security interest only provides protection in bankruptcy if it is timely 
and properly perfected.48 Although—in the absence of bankruptcy—
properly attached security interests and lien rights are enforceable by the 
creditor or the lienholder against the debtor,49 once bankruptcy is filed, in 
most cases, an unperfected lien or security interest is of little or no value. 
Unperfected liens and security interests are of little or no value 
because a debtor in bankruptcy has sweeping “strong arm” powers that 
permit the trustee to avoid unperfected liens or security interests.50 Once 
an unperfected lien or security interest is avoided, the creditor will be left 
as a general unsecured creditor down the bankruptcy payment waterfall 
with a reduced recovery, if any.51 This result cannot be cured after the 
institution of bankruptcy proceedings. Upon the filing of a bankruptcy 
case, the automatic stay prevents a holder of an unperfected lien or security 
interest from perfecting such interest.52 Thus, after the petition date, the 
holder of an unperfected contractual lien or security interest holder in most 
cases will have little recourse other than its rights as an unsecured creditor.  
b. Perfecting a Security Interest or Lien Against the Wrong 
Counterparty 
Another all-too-common mistake, particularly with oil and gas assets 
for which record title may be a complex issue, is to obtain and perfect a 
lien or a security interest against the wrong entity. Corporate formalities 
                                                                                                             
 48. 11 U.S.C. § 544. 
 49. First Cmty. Bank v. E.M. Williams & Sons, Inc. (In re E.M. Williams & 
Sons, Inc.), No. 08-3055-KRH, 2009 WL 2211727, at *2 n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
July 17, 2009); In re Kwan Hun Baek, 240 B.R. 633, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).  
 50. See, e.g., Knostman v. W. Loop Sav. Ass’n (In re Newman), 993 F.2d 90 
(5th Cir. 1993). 
 51. See 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
 52. Id. § 362(a)(4) (staying any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien). But 
it should be noted that holders of inchoate mechanics liens that incept before 
bankruptcy may file an affidavit or other such filing to perfect such interest. 
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are recognized in bankruptcy, which typically means that each affiliated 
debtor will file its own bankruptcy case with each debtor being treated as 
separate for purposes of, among other things, distributions to creditors.53  
While affiliated debtors may frequently be jointly administered in 
bankruptcy, substantive consolidation—treating separate debtors as a 
single distributive pool—is the exception rather than the rule.54 In the 
absence of substantive consolidation of all the debtors, an undertaking that 
was originally given by an entity that did not actually hold an interest in 
the property will typically mean that the purported lien or security interest 
is treated as a nullity and that the holder of the security agreement is a 
general unsecured creditor in the bankruptcy case. Thus, it is crucial for 
the counterparty seeking to establish secured status in a bankruptcy case 
to ensure that the lien or security interest is obtained from, and perfected 
against, the record owner of the property. 
A financing statement that fails to sufficiently provide the debtor’s 
name could be “seriously misleading,” and therefore not effective to 
perfect a security interest. For example, in In re Tyringham Holdings, Inc. 
v. Suna Brothers, Inc., a relatively minor error voided the security 
interest.55 Suna filed a UCC-1 financing statement to perfect its security 
interest in consigned goods under Article 9.56 The debtor’s name, as 
contained in Virginia’s records, was “Tyringham Holdings, Inc.,” but 
Suna’s financing statement listed the debtor’s name only as “Tyringham 
Holdings.”57 The bankruptcy court held that the financing statement was 
seriously misleading because the search logic used by the state of 
incorporation considered “Inc.” a significant and necessary word.58 Therefore, 
it is imperative to name the proper entity when perfecting a security interest 
or lien against a counterparty. 
c. Failure to Perfect a Security Interest or Lien as Soon as Possible 
A final common pitfall associated with obtaining security interests or 
liens concerns the timing of the perfection of that interest. In practice, to 
be of value in bankruptcy, the lien or security interest should be perfected 
contemporaneously with the attachment of the lien or security interest for 
                                                                                                             
 53. In re Fernandes, 346 B.R. 521, 522 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006). 
 54. Clyde Bergemann, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (In re Babcock & 
Wilcox Co.), 250 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Las Torres Dev., L.L.C., 
413 B.R. 687, 693 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).  
 55. Tyringham Holdings, Inc. v. Suna Bros., Inc. (In re Tyringham Holdings, 
Inc.), 354 B.R. 363, 365 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 366. 
 58. Id. at 368. 
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two reasons. First, perfection of the lien or security interest after the fact 
will result in a preference or avoidance risk to the counterparty if the 
debtor files bankruptcy within 90 days of perfection.59 Second, the lien or 
security interest only has value to the extent that the value of the 
underlying property exceeds the amount of any prior liens against the same 
property.60 Because the priority of a lien or security interest often is based 
upon first to file, value that otherwise could be captured in a bankruptcy 
case often is lost by a delay in perfection and resultant loss of priority to 
intervening liens.61  
In an age of highly-leveraged companies and mezzanine lending, it is 
important to consider the impact of modern financing practices on the 
value of contractual liens for junior secured creditors. If, for example, the 
lien of the secured financier is recorded in advance of the recordation of a 
JOA, which has an imbedded reciprocal lien among the parties to the JOA 
upon the filing of a bankruptcy case, the lien in favor of the secured 
financier may consume all the available value and leave the counterparty 
to the JOA with a wholly unsecured claim. This reality of modern finance 
highlights the need to record and perfect a lien or security interest as soon 
as possible to ensure the highest priority possible upon the filing of a 
bankruptcy case.  
In short, to maximize value to a secured creditor once bankruptcy is 
filed, a lien or security interest should be perfected against the correct 
counterparty contemporaneously with the attachment of the security 
interest or lien. But the manner of attachment and perfection will vary with 
the type of lien and applicable state law. 
2. Perfecting Oil and Gas Liens 
JOAs give rise to credit risk for all of the working interest owners that 
are parties to the agreements, both operators and non-operators. For 
instance, operators frequently make advances on behalf of non-operators for 
both capital expenditures and lease operating expenses. Upon the 
bankruptcy of the non-operator, claims for both capital expenditure amounts 
and for unpaid lease operating expenses will be prepetition claims against 
                                                                                                             
 59. Bergner v. Bank One, Milwaukee N.A. (In re P.A. Bergner & Co. 
Holding Co.), 187 B.R. 964, 983 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995). 
 60. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); Fin. 
Sec. Assurance Inc. v. T-H New Orleans L.P. (In re T-H New Orleans L.P.), 116 
F.3d 790, 800 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding junior lienholders only have a secured 
claim if value of collateral exceeds senior liens).  
 61. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.322(a)(1) (West 2011); U.C.C. § 9-
322 (2010). 
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the non-operator. Operators, on the other hand, typically market 
hydrocarbons on behalf of non-operators before paying the non-operators. 
As a result, the non-operators often take the credit risk of the operator. In 
that circumstance, the bankruptcy of the operator will result in the non-
operators being left with claims for hydrocarbons that have been produced 
and sold prior to the bankruptcy case.  
To reduce this risk, the terms of JOAs often include reciprocal 
contractual liens to secure the performance of a counterparty. For example, 
Section VII.B of the A.A.P.L. Form 610-1989 Model Form Operating 
Agreement, which is one of the most commonly used forms of operating 
agreements, includes a reciprocal contractual lien and security interest in 
both current and future acquired real property located within the “Contract 
Area,” and a security interest in the currently-owned and after-acquired 
personal property and fixtures related to the real property.  
The manner of perfecting the lien and security interest in a JOA will 
vary with applicable state law. To ensure the enforceability and priority of 
such liens and security interests in the underlying oil and gas interests, the 
parties must perfect these interests by executing, acknowledging, and 
recording a memorandum of the operating agreement in the appropriate 
land records of the county or counties where the lands are located.62 If a 
Contract Area under an operating agreement is located in two or more 
counties, parties should record the memorandum in all applicable counties. 
                                                                                                             
 62. See, e.g., Amarex, Inc. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 772 P.2d 905, 906 
(Okla. 1987) (“The operator’s lien created by the A.A.P.L. Form 610–1977 Model 
Form Operating Agreement is a contractual lien. In order to perfect such a 
contractual lien against a working interest owner’s real property rights, an 
operator must file an operating agreement in the land records of the county or 
counties where the lands are located. Such an instrument must be executed, 
attested and acknowledged in accordance with the statutory formalities found in 
Title 16 of the Oklahoma Statutes.”); Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982) (reference to an operating agreement in the 
chain of title placed competing interests on notice of the operating agreement); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:217 (Supp. 2015) (“In lieu of filing an [operating] 
agreement as provided in R.S. 31:216, the parties thereto may file a declaration 
signed by them, or signed by any person designated in the agreement as the 
general operator or agent of the parties, describing the lands affected by the 
mineral rights that are the subject of the agreement, stating in general terms the 
nature or import of the agreement, and stating where the agreement may be found. 
The recording officer of the parish in which the declaration is filed may copy into 
his records only the declaration, without the exhibit attached thereto. The 
declaration when so filed shall serve as full and complete notice of the agreement 
to the same extent as if the original agreement had been filed and recorded.”). 
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To perfect in personality, parties must file a UCC-1 with the Secretary of State 
of the operating agreement counterparty’s state of incorporation.63 
In some states such as North Dakota, the working interest owners rely 
upon the forced pooling order to allocate expenses and risk penalties and often 
do not enter into an operating agreement. If the working interest owners do 
enter into an operating agreement, the agreement merely supplements the 
forced pooling order. Any liens granted in forced pooling orders need to be 
perfected in accordance with state law. For example, in addition to any 
contractual lien, Oklahoma grants operators of pooled units a statutory lien on 
participating interests in the unit to secure the costs of operation.64 These liens 
may be perfected by filing a land-record filing that shows the unit approval 
and the participation of particular leases or interests.65  
B. Mitigating Risk Through Setoff and Recoupment 
Another way to mitigate working interest owner credit risk under a JOA 
is through setoff and recoupment. In many cases, counterparties to oil and gas 
agreements will have reciprocal payables and receivables owed and owing to 
each other. For example, a producer that has entered into a gathering 
agreement—in which hydrocarbons produced at the well head are physically 
sold to the gatherer—may simultaneously have both an obligation to pay for 
ongoing gathering services (an account payable) and a right to be paid for 
hydrocarbons that are being continuously purchased by the gatherer (an 
account receivable). This scenario may create a right of setoff in the context 
of bankruptcy proceedings.66 
A right of setoff is analogous to a security interest67 and arises where 
counterparties have reciprocal debts and obligations.68 In some circumstances, 
                                                                                                             
 63. Arrow Oil & Gas, Inc. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.), 407 
B.R. 112, 136 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). 
 64. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.8 (2011) (voluntary pooled unit 
liens); Id. § 87.1(e) (2011 & Supp. 2015) (forced pooled unit liens). 
 65. See TCINA, Inc. v. NOCO Inv. Co., 95 P.3d 193, 195 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2004) (interpreting operator’s liens that arise under Oklahoma Statutes title 52, 
section 287.8); see also GasRock Capital, L.L.C. v. EnDevCo Eureka, L.L.C., 313 
P.3d 1028, 1034–35 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013) (holding that an operator’s lien 
subject to Oklahoma Statutes title 52, section 287.8 was perfected by the land-
record filing of a notice of approval of the unit and that it was “inconsequential” 
when drilling services were performed).  
 66. See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (2014). 
 67. The right to offset is termed the right to “setoff” in the Bankruptcy Code. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 553(a); In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc., 391 F.3d 629, 636 
(5th Cir. 2004). 
 68. See 11 U.S.C. § 553. 
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accounts payable and accounts receivable may be set off against each other.69 
In bankruptcy, parties can offset “mutual” debts—debts between the same 
parties standing in the same capacity—that arose prior to the commencement 
of the bankruptcy case.70 The Bankruptcy Code does not create this right of 
setoff; it merely preserves setoff rights created under applicable non-
bankruptcy law and then only to the extent that the conditions of section 553 
have been satisfied.71  
The threshold determination in every case involving section 553 is the 
source of the alleged setoff right. Recognizing the right of setoff in bankruptcy 
often allows the creditor holding the right to recover a greater percentage of 
its claim than other creditors who have no setoff entitlement.72 The automatic 
stay, however, prevents a contract counterparty from offsetting an account 
payable against an account receivable without modification of the automatic 
stay.73 
A related contractual risk-mitigation principle is recoupment. Setoff 
applies to mutual debts between the same parties standing in the same capacity 
but does not require that the debts arise out of the same agreement. 
Recoupment, on the other hand, is the netting of obligations within or among 
the same agreement.74 Thus, recoupment is more narrowly applied.75 But 
                                                                                                             
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. § 553(a); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A, 814 F.2d 
1030, 1036 (5th Cir. 1987) (mutuality requirement for setoff was met because the 
debt was incurred prepetition); Sherman v. First City Bank of Dall. (In re United 
Sciences of Am., Inc.), 893 F.2d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 1990) (bank’s setoff was not 
in violation of the Bankruptcy Code since the bank’s agreement created the 
mutuality of the debts between the parties); Cohen v. Sav. Building & Loan Co. 
(In re Bevill, Breler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp.), 896 F.2d 54, 59 (3d Cir. 
1990) (bank’s possession of interest payments does not constitute a mutual debt 
for purposes of setoff because bank was merely a trustee); Davidovich v. Welton 
(In re Davidovich), 901 F.2d 1533, 1538 (10th Cir. 1990) (former partner was not 
entitled to offset for amount allegedly owed to him pursuant to debtor’s post-
petition default because he did not meet the “mutuality” requirement). 
 71. Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1995); N.Y. State 
Elec. & Gas Co. v. McMahon (In re McMahon), 129 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Stephenson v. Salisbury (In re Coreland Corp.), 967 F.2d 1069, 1076 (5th Cir. 
1992).  
 72. See Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 237 U.S. 447, 455 (1915).  
 73. Szymanski v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. (In re Szymanski), 413 B.R. 232, 
240 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).  
 74. Holford v. Powers (In re Holford), 896 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1990); In 
re Brown, 325 B.R. 169, 175–76 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2005).  
 75. Recently, some courts have applied recoupment even more narrowly. See, 
e.g., Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Mirant Ams. Energy Mktg., LP (In re Mirant 
Corp.), 318 B.R. 377, 381 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that recoupment 
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recoupment is not subject to the automatic stay.76 Several courts have applied 
the doctrine of recoupment and lifted the automatic stay, to the extent 
necessary, to allow an operator to exercise its rights against a non-operator 
pursuant to a JOA.77 Therefore, a contract counterparty should consider 
whether the netting of amounts owed to and owed by a debtor are so closely 
tied together contractually that recoupment, not setoff, may be applicable. 
IV. TREATMENT OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND OIL AND GAS LEASES  
A third type of contractual relationship that could be threatened by 
bankruptcy proceedings is a mineral lease. Because a mineral lease involves 
ongoing rights and obligations, there may be a concern that the lease might be 
held to be an “executory contract” or “unexpired lease” under the Bankruptcy 
Code. Counterparty credit risk may be drastically different depending on 
whether a contract qualifies as an “executory contract” or an “unexpired 
lease” under the Bankruptcy Code. In particular, debtors may reject executory 
contracts and unexpired “true” leases, in which case the other party may be 
left with a mere unsecured claim for damages.78  
A. Characterization of Oil and Gas Leases 
The nature of the rights created or conveyed by an agreement is a 
matter of non-bankruptcy law.79 Although the majority of oil and gas 
contracts—for example, operating agreements, participation agreements, 
area of mutual interest agreements, development agreements, take-or-pay 
contracts, etc.—are executory contracts governed by section 365 of the 
                                                                                                             
should be narrowly applied and that an “overpayment or something like it” such 
as “harm to a creditor or benefit to a debtor in excess of that contemplated by the 
Code” must be shown to justify recoupment). 
 76. In re Holford, 896 F.2d at 179; In re McWilliams, 384 B.R. 728, 729 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2008).  
 77.  See, e.g., Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank v. Enstar Petroleum Co. (In re Buttes Res. 
Co.), 89 B.R. 613, 617 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988) (holding that an operator could 
recoup production costs advanced before the petition from pre- and post-petition 
proceeds payments owed to the non-operator debtor); Garmers Union Cent. Exch., 
Inc. v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank (In re Buttes Gas & Oil), 72 B.R. 236 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 1987) (holding that the doctrine of recoupment applied where the operator’s 
right to reimbursement for costs and the non-operator’s right to proceeds arose 
from a JOA). 
 78. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2014). 
 79. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (the Bankruptcy Code does 
not create or define property interests but leaves that for state law or for applicable 
non-bankruptcy law).  
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Bankruptcy Code,80 the nature of a mineral lease varies among different 
jurisdictions.  
In almost all hydrocarbon producing states, an oil, gas, or mineral 
lease conveys a real property interest to the lessee.81 Thus, for the most 
part, an oil and gas lease creates a presently vested interest in real property 
that is not subject to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.82 Even if a 
debtor–lessor were able to reject an oil and gas lease in bankruptcy, section 
365 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the lessee to retain its rights under the 
lease for the term of the lease and any extensions.83 
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) and the Bureau 
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”) of the Department of 
Interior (“DOI”), however, have stated that the apparent position of the 
United States government is that a federal lease is subject to rejection 
under section 365.84 The DOI reasons that federal leases are governed by 
federal, rather than state, law and are subject to disposition under sections 
365 and 541 of the Bankruptcy Code based on the plain language of the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), which includes the 
statement that OCS leases are “rental agreements to use real property.”85  
                                                                                                             
 80. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 69 B.R. 960, 963 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987). 
 81. See, e.g., Foothills Tex., Inc., v. MTGLQ Investors, L.P. (In re: Foothills 
Tex., Inc.), 476 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012); In re WRT Energy Corp., 202 
B.R. 579 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1996); In re Frederick Petroleum Corp., 98 B.R. 762 
(S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Hanson Oil Co., 97 B.R. 468 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989). 
 82. Terry Oilfield Supply Co. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 195 B.R. 66, 70–73 
(S.D. Tex. 1966); In re WRT Energy Corp., 202 B.R. at 583; In re Frederick 
Petroleum, 98 B.R. at 767; In re Clark Res., 68 B.R. 358, 360 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 
1986). 
 83.  11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii). 
 84. See, e.g., United States’ Motion to Intervene, NGP Capital Res. Co. v. 
ATP Oil & Gas Corp., No. 12-36187, Adv. No. 12-03443 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012) 
[Dkt No. 13] (“[A] Federal Lease is, pursuant to its enabling statutes, a ‘rental 
agreement to use real property’ subject to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
“On October 1, 2011, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 
Enforcement (BOEMRE), formerly the Minerals Management Service (MMS), 
was replaced by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) as part of a major 
reorganization.” Reorganization of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation and Enforcement, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REG. & 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.boemre.gov/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).  
 85. See Frontier Energy, LLC v. Aurora Energy, Ltd. (In re Aurora Oil & Gas 
Corp.), 439 B.R. 674, 680 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 
365(m)).  
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Although many cases have addressed the issue of whether a mineral 
lease is a true lease or an executory contract under section 365,86 none have 
considered this issue with respect to a federal OCS lease. Nonetheless, it is 
typical for the OCS and other governmental agencies to take the position 
that government oil and gas leases are not conveyances of an interest in real 
property and are, in fact, subject to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.87 
B. Assumption and Assignment of Oil and Gas Leases 
A debtor may, subject to court approval, assume and assign executor 
contracts and unexpired leases. Anti-alienation provisions that limit or 
prohibit the assignment of a contract or lease, however, are unenforceable 
in bankruptcy.88 Therefore, a debtor for the most part has the power to 
assign a contract or lease without the consent of contract counterparties, 
which would be required in the absence of bankruptcy. For example, a 
debtor could assume and assign an operating agreement over the objection 
of the non-operating joint interest owners, even if, in the absence of 
bankruptcy, consent of the non-operator would have been a necessary 
condition to such assignment.89 
While a debtor decides whether to assume or reject an executory 
contract or unexpired lease, the non-debtor party must continue to perform 
under the contract.90 During this “gap period,” the non-debtor party will 
bear the risk and uncertainty that results from not knowing whether the 
contract will be rejected, assumed, or assumed and assigned.91 Particularly 
with “core contracts” that are central to a producer’s business, the 
uncertainty surrounding whether such an agreement will be assumed or 
rejected and whether the counterparty will have sufficient capital to meet 
its ongoing obligations thereunder can layer on enormous additional risks 
for capital-intensive projects. In certain circumstances, a creditor may seek 
                                                                                                             
 86. See, e.g., Terry Oilfield Supply Co. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 195 B.R. 66, 
70 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996) (showing that Texas has determined that mineral lease 
is not an executor contract under section 365).  
 87. United States’ Motion to Intervene, supra note 84; Response of the 
United States to Trustee’s Motion for Determination, Sonoma Energy Corp., No. 
08-34430-H4-7 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.) [Dkt. No. 116]. 
 88. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f).  
 89. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 69 B.R. 960, 963 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987). 
 90. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 532 (1984). 
 91. See Mitchell E. Ayer, Common Issues in Oil and Gas Bankruptcy, 34 
ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 239, 243–46 (2013). 
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to reduce this uncertainty by seeking to shorten the time period for a debtor 
to assume or reject an agreement.92 
In addition, as more Chapter 11 cases culminate in sales of the debtors’ 
assets, debtors—often at the behest of prospective buyers—often link the 
sale of assets pursuant to section 363 (through a plan of reorganization or 
otherwise) to assumption and assignment of contracts pursuant to section 
365.93 Assumption and assignment of an executory contract or unexpired 
lease requires notice to the non-debtor party and a showing, among other 
things that: (1) any defaults pursuant to the contract sought to be assigned 
have or will be cured as a condition to such assignment, and (2) there is 
“adequate assurance of future performance” under the terms of the 
contract on the part of prospective assignee.94 As sales of all or a portion 
of the debtors’ assets continue to be a preferred exit strategy for Chapter 
11 debtors, contract counterparties must take care to track bankruptcy 
cases for developments that could impact their rights.95  
V. PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENTS 
Another type of contractual relationship that may be threatened by 
bankruptcy proceedings is a purchase and sale agreement (“PSA”). A PSA 
typically does not immediately transfer ownership. There is usually a 
period of time to conduct due diligence between the signing of the PSA 
and the closing.96 Prior to consummation, a PSA is almost certainly an 
executory contract subject to rejection by the bankrupt debtor.97 But even 
after a transaction has been consummated, there may be claims—such as 
                                                                                                             
 92. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2); Tex. Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de P.R., 360 
F.2d 582, 583 (5th Cir. 1966). In a Chapter 11 case, a debtor has until confirmation 
of a plan—which, in some cases, may take a year or longer—to assume or reject 
an executory contract in the absence of a court order shortening that time period. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2). 
 93. See, e.g., In re Cano Petroleum, Inc., No. 12-31549, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 
3281 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 18, 2012). 
 94. River Prod. Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 
1990).  
 95. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(B), (C). 
 96. If the diligence is done in advance, the parties may have a transaction 
“sign and close” on the same day. 
 97. See 11 U.S.C. § 365; Butler v. Resident Care Innovation Corp., 241 B.R. 
37, 45–46 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1999) (finding the agreements at issue to be executory 
because the agreements remained substantially unperformed by both parties).  
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claims for indemnity—that arise under the agreement that need to be taken 
into account once the debtor enters bankruptcy.  
Creditors arguably must file such contingent claims, which arise under 
fully consummated agreements, or risk losing them.98 When a party to a 
PSA has been given notice of the bankruptcy of a counterparty, 
consideration should be given to what, if any, ongoing claims may exist 
against the debtor. For example, there may be outstanding indemnity 
obligations on the part of the buyer—such as for plug and abandonment or 
other remediation liability—that continue long after consummation of the 
transaction. Even if these contingent claims have not been liquidated, the 
Bankruptcy Code in some circumstances permits estimation of these 
contingent claims in a manner that will permit such claimants to participate 
in distributions in a bankruptcy case.99 Accordingly, a proof of claim 
should be filed under these circumstances or the creditor will risk the loss 
of the claim (contingent or not) forever. 
VI. MITIGATING RISKS RELATED TO FARMOUTS 
AND PRODUCTION PAYMENTS 
A final type of contractual relationship that may be threatened by 
bankruptcy proceedings is a farmout agreement. A farmout agreement is “a 
contract to assign oil and gas lease rights in certain acreage upon completion 
of drilling obligations and the performance of any other covenants and 
conditions therein contained.”100 Because this arrangement usually arises 
when a mineral lessee is unable to maintain its lease past the primary term 
and the lease is nearing expiration, the lessee will “farm out” its lease in 
exchange for an overriding royalty or carried interest.101 Although this 
arrangement is technically an executory contract and would otherwise be 
subject to avoidance,102 there are special rules regarding farmout agreements. 
The Bankruptcy Code contains a special set of rules—or “safe harbor” 
provisions—for both the farmee and the holder of a production payment 
in circumstances spelled out by the Bankruptcy Code.103 If a farmout falls 
within the bankruptcy safe harbor, then even a debtor’s rejection of the 
farmout agreement as an executory contract will not impact the rights of 
the farmee, at least with respect to any interest that had been earned as of 
                                                                                                             
 98. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c).  
 99. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay 
Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 957 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 100. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, OIL AND GAS 774 (9th ed. 2011). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4).  
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the petition date.104 Further, a production payment that meets the statutory 
definition is subject to its own safe harbor and is a property right separate 
and apart from the bankruptcy estate.105  
The distinction between the holder of a separate property interest—
like a production payee or farmee—and a secured creditor is a crucial 
distinction in bankruptcy. This is because a creditor’s separate property 
interest, for the most part, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court and, therefore, is not subject to being stripped or 
modified in bankruptcy.106 In contrast, if a counterparty is merely a secured 
creditor, the counterparty’s property interest is subject to the increased risk 
of impact, including a bankruptcy court: (1) permitting a debtor to use the 
proceeds or revenues from the collateral over the objection of the secured 
creditor pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 363(c)(2), or (2) forcing, 
through a plan of reorganization pursuant to section 1129(b), a 
modification of repayment terms on the contract counterparty—for 
example, a “cramdown.”  
Thus, if a counterparty is choosing, for example, between a conveyance 
of a production payment or a claim that is secured by a claim on property of 
the estate, in many cases, the former is preferable because the production 
payment should “pass through” the bankruptcy case with a reduced risk of 
impairment. 
VII. INCLUDE BAD BOY GUARANTIES IN THE “CREDIT TOOLKIT” 
 WHEN CONDUCTING OIL AND GAS DEALS 
Although some strategies are particular to the contractual relationship 
under consideration, others may apply more widely. One such example is 
the “Bad Boy” guaranty. 
“Bad Boy” or “Springing Recourse” guaranties107 have changed the 
face of real estate lending. In the 1980s, real estate developers would put 
their single asset properties with non-recourse mortgages into bankruptcy 
with the hope that keeping it in bankruptcy would allow them a chance to 
have rents or prices increase. This tactic increased the cost of lenders to 
foreclose. The mortgage lenders’ response was to have the mortgage 
                                                                                                             
 104. See In re Res. Tech. Corp., 254 B.R. 215, 222 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
The language of section 541(b)(4)(A) could also be read to insulate unearned 
acreage as of the petition date; however, no court has directly addressed such 
issue. 
 105. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4)(B). 
 106. 11 U.S.C. § 541; but see 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (permitting bankruptcy trustee 
to force a sale of a co-owner’s interest along with the debtor’s interest in property).  
 107. Such guaranties are sometimes referred to as “non-recourse carveouts.” 
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documents provide that the borrower and one or more guarantors will 
become liable for the entire loan balance if certain prohibited acts occurred. 
This clause is referred to as a springing recourse provision. Although 
traditional bad acts have been fraud, misappropriation of funds, willful 
misconduct, gross negligence, and unauthorized transfer of collateral, “bad 
acts” can also include the borrower’s filing a bankruptcy petition. 
By imposing personal liability on the guarantor who is usually in charge 
of the borrower, bad boy guaranties create a financial disincentive for the 
guarantor to cause or even permit the borrower to impede the lender’s 
collateral enforcement action by filing a bankruptcy petition. The resulting 
liability for breach depends on negotiated terms. A bad boy guaranty can 
provide for consequential damages resulting for breach, full recourse 
liability, or anything in between.108 
The courts that have looked at these provisions generally find that the 
lender protections are enforceable109 and the non-recourse event need not 
be within the guarantor’s control.110 
Although widely used in real estate, “bad boy” guaranties are generally 
not seen in connection with oil and gas transactions.111 But their use could 
be expanded to cover comparable non-recourse events, such as where the 
operator converts funds belonging to override owners, converts funds from 
production payment, or files bankruptcy and seeks to re-characterize 
                                                                                                             
 108. Sebastian F.C. Kaufmann & Arthur J. Steinberg, New Decisions Offer 
Lessons on Bad Boy Guaranties, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 2012, at 1, available at 
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/kspublic/library/publication/2012articles/3-12 
nyljsteinbergkaufman.pdf. Courts have upheld these guaranties. 
 109. See, e.g., Heller Fin. Inc. v. Lee, No. 01 C 6798, 2002 WL 1888591 (N.D. 
Ill., Aug. 16, 2002) (holding that a hotel was encumbered with liens without 
lender’s prior written consent and enforcing the non-recourse carve-out clause for 
loan obligations for breach of loan covenants); LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Mobile Hotel 
Props., LLC, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (E.D. La. 2004) (enforcing the non-recourse 
carve-out clause when the borrower amended its articles of incorporation so that 
it was no longer a single purpose entity); Blue Hills Office Park LLC v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank, 477 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Mass. 2007) (enforcing a springing 
guaranty for personal liability for the full amount of indebtedness against two real 
estate developers that failed to disclose or pay over to the lender a $2 million 
settlement related to a commercial development dispute); 111 Debt Acquisition 
Inc. v. Six Ventures, Ltd., No. C2-08-768, 2009 WL 414181 (S.D. Ohio, Feb 18, 
2009) (springing guaranty enforced against guarantors when borrower filed for 
bankruptcy). 
 110. Michigan, Non-Recourse Mortgage Loan Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 445.1591 to 445.1595 (West Supp. 2015); Ohio, Legacy Trust Act, OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 5816.01 to 5816.14 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015), have passed laws 
limiting the use of bad boy guaranties. 
 111. This Author has seen individual guaranties when an investor was putting 
in 100% of funds and the geologist was contributing expertise and leases. 
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production payments or overrides. This type of conduct was certainly not 
contemplated by the parties. It is beyond the scope of this Article to delineate 
the scope of such guaranties or the litany of conduct that could be prevented, 
but this is something that should be in the credit toolkit.  
VIII. MITIGATING REGULATORY RISKS 
When a debtor’s property includes interests in unproductive oil or gas 
wells, the debtor may seek to abandon such interest to relieve the estate of 
burdensome liabilities pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 554.112 
Therefore, the issue often arises as to whether a debtor may exercise its 
“abandonment” power to abandon property burdened by regulatory 
obligations.  
There are several state or federal obligations that may arise at the end of 
an oil or gas well’s useful life.113 Such obligations include the “plugging” of 
the well and removal of facilities from the site, and are defined as “plugging 
and abandonment” (“P&A”) or “decommissioning activities” pursuant to 
federal regulations.114 Further, to protect the United States from incurring a 
financial loss, the DOI has instituted a bonding program for federal lands. 
Before the DOI will issue a new lease or approve the assignment of an 
existing lease, the lessee or designated operator is required to obtain a 
surety bond guaranteeing performance of all contractual and regulatory 
obligations under that lease.115 
Courts have generally held that a debtor’s abandonment power does 
not allow release from such obligations, finding that, under federal law, 
debtors must comply with state law.116 Further, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
                                                                                                             
 112. See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (allowing a debtor to abandon certain property of the 
estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the 
estate). 
 113. See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 89.011 (West 2010). Texas 
Natural Resources Code section 89.011 provides: “The operator of a well shall 
properly plug the well when required and in accordance with the commission’s 
rules that are in effect at the time of the plugging.” Id. § 89.011(a). 
 114. 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.1700 to 250.1754 (2015). 
 115. 30 C.F.R. § 556.52. The United States requires supplemental bonds for 
costs associated with specific oil and gas facilities, abandonment and site clearance. 
Id. 
 116. See, e.g., Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.), 151 F.3d 434, 437 
(5th Cir. 1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 959(b); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986) (holding that a trustee may not abandon 
property in contravention of a state law reasonably designed to protect public 
health or safety)). But see In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572, 576 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 
1991) (holding that a violation of state and federal environmental laws must be 
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Appeals has held that P&A liabilities are entitled to administrative claim 
priority if the plugging obligations accrued post-petition under state law 
because the debtor cannot avoid such liability. Thus, the expenses are 
“necessary” and “beneficial” to the estate under an administrative claim 
analysis.117  
Because P&A liability can be significant, particularly in the case of 
offshore wells, a provision for payment of P&A expenses can become a 
threshold issue in the administration or sale of oil and gas properties in 
offshore bankruptcy cases. In fact, because a bankrupt operator may seek 
to either transfer or cease operations on a lease, non-operators in the chain 
of title may need to intervene to ensure that the P&A liabilities—for which 
they may otherwise be financially responsible—are satisfied by the 
operator or assumed by any successor. 
CONCLUSION 
Oil and gas companies manage all types of risk—price risk, political 
risk, geological risk, etc. Credit risk, however, is often ignored. Given the 
large amount of money involved in oil and gas transactions, companies 
must have systems in place to protect their lien rights in sales and operating 
agreements. Likewise, when appropriate, transactions should be structured 
to employ the safe harbors of production payments and farmout 
agreements. This foresight and diligence will achieve the benefit of its 
bargain if the counterparty files bankruptcy.  
  
                                                                                                             
coupled with a showing that the violation constitutes an imminent and identifiable 
harm to limit the trustee’s powers of abandonment). Notably, in finding that the 
trustee was permitted to abandon the contaminated property, the Shore Court 
“place[d] great weight on the lack of activity on the part of a state agency charged 
with protecting the health and welfare of the people of the State of Texas.” 134 
B.R. at 579. 
 117. In re H.L.S. Energy Co., 151 F.3d at 437. 
